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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 06-2681

VERNA JAMES SEKEON,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent

Petition for Review of the Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(A96-203-444)
Immigration Judge: Hon. Donald V. Ferlise

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 9, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, HARDIMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 12, 2007 )
_______
OPINION

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Verna James Sekeon petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for
withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and relief
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 For the reasons that
follow, we will deny Sekeon’s petition for review.
I.
Sekeon is a male native and citizen of Indonesia. He entered the United States on
September 21, 2001 as a nonimmigrant visitor with authorization to remain until March
20, 2002. On April 19, 2003, he received a notice to appear and was charged with being
subject to removal for remaining in the United States beyond his admission period in
violation of section 237(a)(1)(B) of the INA. In September 2003, Sekeon filed an
application for asylum.2 On February 22, 2005, Sekeon appeared before the Immigration
Judge (“IJ”), asserting that he was entitled to withholding of removal under the INA and
relief under the CAT. The IJ denied these applications. Sekeon thereafter timely
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The BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge’s grant of
Sekeon’s application for voluntary departure.
2

Sekeon failed to file his application for asylum “within 1
year after the date of [his] arrival in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1158(a)(2)(B). Sekeon conceded that his application was not timely
filed and the IJ appropriately limited his decision to Sekeon’s
claims for withholding of removal under the INA and relief under
the CAT.
2

appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, which summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision.3 We
have jurisdiction to review this petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
II.
This court reviews the BIA’s factual finding that an alien has failed to demonstrate
eligibility for relief from removal under the “substantial evidence” test. INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 480 (1992). We will reverse only if no reasonable fact-finder
could have failed to find the past persecution necessary to sustain the petitioner’s burden.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1 (reversal permitted
only where the record evidence “compels” a reasonable factfinder to reach a contrary
determination).
III.
Sekeon contends that the IJ’s conclusion that he did not suffer past persecution and
has no well-founded fear of future prosecution was not supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole. Sekeon testified that as a child in Indonesia, Muslims would
spit on him and call him “unworthy” for practicing his Christian faith. Sekeon testified
that Muslims would disturb religious services in which he was participating, including
throwing stones at the church, and that police intervention was unsuccessful. He also
testified that there were riots in 1998 that destroyed parts of the country, but he conceded
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We review directly the IJ’s decision because the BIA
adopted the ruling of the IJ without further independent analysis.
Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2002).
3

that he was not directly affected by these incidents.
To be eligible for withholding of removal under Section 241(b)(3)(A) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), the applicant must demonstrate that his “life or freedom would
be threatened in [the country of removal] because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” To qualify for relief under
the CAT, the applicant must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he would be
tortured if removed. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). Claims for withholding of removal and
relief under the CAT require a significantly higher burden of proof than a claim for
asylum. See, e.g., Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004) (“An alien who
fails to establish that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution, so as to be eligible
for a grant of asylum, necessarily will fail to establish the right to withholding of
removal.”); Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he standard for
invocation of the CAT is more stringent than the standard for granting asylum.”).
After considering Sekeon’s testimony, the IJ concluded that although Sekeon had
“been honest and forthright in his presentation,” he had not “presented any evidence that
he would be persecuted if he is returned to his country for one of the five statutory
grounds for a grant of relief.” App. at 40.
The IJ relied on this court’s decision in Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530 (3d Cir.
2005), in which we explained that persecution is limited to “threats to life, confinement,
torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or
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freedom.” Id. at 536 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To establish a wellfounded fear of persecution, an applicant must demonstrate through credible testimony
that his fear is genuine and that, objectively, “a reasonable person in the alien’s
circumstances would fear persecution if returned to the country in question.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The IJ concluded that Sekeon had failed to show:
(1) a pattern or practice of past persecution; (2) that Indonesia persecutes Christians or is
unwilling or unable to protect Christians from harm in Indonesia; and (3) that he would
be tortured if he is returned to Indonesia.
Given our highly deferential standard of review, we see no reason to disturb the
findings of the IJ, as they were “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 (quoting
8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4)), and we are not persuaded in this case that a “reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
IV.
We conclude that the IJ’s decision that Sekeon did not suffer past persecution and
would not be subject to torture upon return to Indonesia were supported by substantial
evidence. Accordingly, we will deny his petition.

5

